Security of Continuous-variable quantum cryptography using coherent
  states: Decline of postselection advantage by Namiki, Ryo & Hirano, Takuya
ar
X
iv
:q
ua
nt
-p
h/
05
06
19
3v
1 
 2
3 
Ju
n 
20
05
Security of Continuous-variable quantum cryptography using coherent states: Decline
of postselection advantage
Ryo Namiki∗
CREST Research Team for Photonic Quantum Information,
Division of Materials Physics, Department of Materials Engineering Science,
Graduate school of Engineering Science, Osaka University, Toyonaka, Osaka 560-8531, Japan
Takuya Hirano
Department of Physics, Gakushuin University, Mejiro 1-5-1, Toshima-ku, Tokyo 171-8588, Japan
(Dated: December 9, 2017)
We investigate the security of continuous-variable (CV) quantum key distribution (QKD) using
coherent states in the presence of quadrature excess noise. We consider an eavesdropping attack
which uses a linear amplifier and beam splitter. This attack makes a link between beam-splitting
attack and intercept-resend attack (classical teleportation attack). We also show how postselection
loses its efficiency in a realistic channel.
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Quantum key distribution (QKD) is a technique that al-
lows two parties, Alice (the sender) and Bob (the receiver),
to share a key which is kept secret from an eavesdropper
(Eve) who has advanced computational and technological
power [1]. To achieve a signal transmission between dis-
tant parties, controlling optical quantum states is essen-
tial. Several QKD schemes based on continuous-variable
(CV) which uses the quadrature amplitude of light field
have been proposed [2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11]. Although
usage of squeezed states or EPR states are fundamentally
interesting, coherent-state protocols have practical advan-
tage of easy state preparation. CV QKD using coherent
states over a 1km-optical-fiber path has been experimen-
tally demonstrated at 1.55µm-communication wavelength
[10].
The performance of QKD is limited by the presence of
the transmission loss. A simple treatment of the loss ef-
fect is beam-splitting attack (BSA) where Eve replaces the
transmission path with the lossless one and a beam splitter
(BS). Then she obtains the signals corresponding to the
loss without making any disturbance to the signal. At first
sight, over the existence of 50% loss (3dB loss), it seems to
be impossible to distill the secret key using coherent-state
signal because Eve can get stronger signal than Bob [7].
However, since the knowledge about the signal depends
on the measurement result, coherent-state protocol can
provide a secure key by conditional use of measurement
results (postselection, PS) even in the presence of higher
loss [8, 10, 11]. PS plays an important role in many im-
plementations of quantum information processing tasks as
well as QKD.
In realistic condition, besides the loss, excess Gaussian
noise is imposed on the quadrature distribution [10]. Since
any excess noise tapers off when the state falls into vac-
uum at high loss, the excess noise added by Eve near Al-
ice’s side will disappear at Bob’s side for a long trans-
mission distance. Then, for a sufficiently long distance,
eavesdropping cannot be detectable. From this observa-
tion, it is shown that CV-QKD protocols using coherent
states cannot work for arbitrary transmission distance in
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the presence of excess noise [12]. This limitation is given
by an intercept-resend attack called classical teleportation
attack (CTA).
The question is what kind of attack links between “di-
rect” CTA and “indirect” BSA, and how PS works in the
presence of excess noise. In this Letter, we provide an in-
termediate attack between BSA and CTA, and show how
PS loses its advantage in the presence of noise.
We consider the realistic channel which transforms co-
herent state into a Gaussian mixture of coherent states as
|α〉 → ρˆ(α, η, δ) ≡ 2
piδ
∫
e−
2|β|2
δ |√ηα+ β〉〈√ηα+ β|d2β,
(1)
where η is the line transmission and δ is quadrature ex-
cess noise. Coherent state is eigen state of aˆ: aˆ|α〉 = α|α〉.
We define quadrature amplitude xˆ1, xˆ2 by the relation
aˆ = xˆ1+ ixˆ2. aˆ is the annihilation operator of signal pulse
mode. The quadrature variance of coherent state is given
by (∆x)2 = 14 . As a frame work, we assume that all noise
is caused by Eve in the quantum channel and Bob has
an ideal detector. Then, for coherent-state input to the
channel (1), Bob observes Gaussian quadrature distribu-
tion [10] and the observed quadrature variance (∆xobs)
2
is related to the excess noise as
(∆xobs)
2 = (1 + δ)(∆x)2. (2)
Bob’s mean values of quadratures can be related to the
transmission and coherent-state amplitude as
〈xˆ1〉+ i〈xˆ2〉 = √ηα. (3)
In terms of δ and η, the limitation given by CTA is δ < 2η.
We refer to it as classical teleportation limit (CTL) [12].
Some of eavesdropping attacks which cause the state
change (1) can be constructed by combining BSs and
phase-insensitive amplifiers (AMP). Simplest case is that
Eve uses only one BS and one AMP. If Eve uses the Ampli-
fiers after the BS, Eve’s and Bob’s quadratures are mod-
ulated independently. Thus the results of Bob’s quadra-
ture measurement and Eve’s state are not correlated, and
the effectiveness of PS is inherently different from that
of BSA [12]. Here we consider the other case which
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FIG. 1: Eve uses a beam splitter (BS) with transmission κ
after performing a phase-insensitive amplifier (AMP) with am-
plification gain g. β is amplification noise.
we call amplification-beam-splitting attack (AMPBSA)
where Eve inserts BS after AMP (see FIG. 1).
Let us assume that Eve operates a phase-insensitive am-
plifier [13] with amplifier gain g ≥ 1 and inserts a BS with
reflectivity 1 − κ (see Fig. 1). Then g and κ are related
to Bob’s mean value and variance of quadratures as
〈xˆ1〉+ i〈xˆ2〉 = √gκα, (4)
(∆xobs)
2 = {2(g − 1)κ+ 1}(∆x)2. (5)
Using Eqs. (2), (3), (4) and (5), we obtain
g =
η
η − δ/2 , (6)
κ = η − δ/2. (7)
From Eq. (6), we can see that BSA (δ = 0) is the unit
gain case: g = 1, and CTL (δ → 2η) is relevant to the
infinite-gain limit: g →∞.
Provided Alice sent |α〉, Eve’s operation makes the joint
state of Bob and Eve:
|α〉B |0〉E → ρˆBE(α, η, δ) ≡ 2
piδ
∫
e−
2
δ
|β|2|√ηα+ β〉B〈√ηα+ β| ⊗
∣∣∣ξ(√ηα+ β)〉
E
〈
ξ(
√
ηα+ β)
∣∣∣ d2β, (8)
where we defined
ξ ≡
√
1− η + δ/2
η − δ/2 . (9)
The subscripts B and E stand for Bob’s and Eve’s system,
respectively. We can easily see that TrE (ρˆBE) = ρˆ(α, η, δ)
where TrE is partial trace of Eve’s system.
The form of ρˆBE shows that Eve receives |ξ(√ηα+ β)〉
when Bob receives |√ηα + β〉 i.e., the coherent state Eve
receives is different from that of Bob’s only by the ampli-
tude factor ξ for each transmission. This simple picture
is useful to explain (i)CTL and (ii)3dB loss limit [7] as
follows:
(i) If ξ becomes infinity (δ → 2η or g → ∞), Eve can
read out the coherent-state amplitude
√
ηα+β with arbi-
trary resolution by performing simultaneous measurement
of quadratures. In other words, she can determine the
state Bob receives |√ηα + β〉 or she can produce infinite
number of copies of this state. This condition is equivalent
to the case of intercept-resend attack, and it demonstrates
CTL.
(ii) A sufficient condition for secure key distribution
against individual attack is
IAB ≥ IAE , (10)
where IAB(AE) is Mutual information between Alice and
Bob (Eve) [8, 14, 15]. For Gaussian continuous key distri-
bution protocols [6, 7], the Mutual information is directly
related to the signal-to-noise ratio (SNR); the higher is
the SNR, the higher is the amount of mutual information
between the parties. The case ξ ≤ 1 means Bob’s SNR is
higher than that of Eve because in Eq. (8) Bob’s coherent-
state amplitude is larger than that of Eve’s. Thus, the
security condition given in (10) is written as
ξ ≤ 1. (11)
If δ = 0, we obtain a reduced condition η ≥ 1/2 which
gives the 3dB loss limit. This analysis excludes reverse-
reconciliation protocol of [9].
Now we go into the security of PS protocol against
AMPBSA. In the postselection protocol [8, 10, 11] , a mea-
surement result x higher than a given threshold x0 ≥ 0 is
selected to distil the secret key. By setting x0 higher, bit-
error rate (BER) of Bob can be arbitrary small provided
the quadrature distribution is Gaussian. In contrast to
this, if Eve’s signal is independent of x, Eve’s BER re-
mains constant under PS. So PS can make information
advantage for Bob compare to Eve. This is not the case
for AMPBSA. In Eq. (8), the modulation β is added to
both of Eve’s and Bob’s systems collectively. Through β,
Eve’s state depends on x and then Eve’s BER depends
on PS. So the correlation between Bob’s and Eve’s state
given by β weakens the PS advantage.
Let us consider the case that Alice sends binary-phase-
shifted coherent states |±α〉 with α > 0 and Bob performs
quadrature measurement on the correct basis xˆ1 [11, 12].
To describe the postselection events, we use Eve’s density
operator conditioned on Bob’s measurement result x. If
Alice sent |α〉 and Bob observed x, Eve’s density operator
(conditioned on x) is given by
ρˆE(α|x) = TrB (ρˆBE(α, η, δ)|x〉B〈x|)
PB(x|α) , (12)
where
PB(x|α) = Tr (ρˆBE(α, η, δ)|x〉B〈x|)
= 〈x|ρˆ(α, η, δ)|x〉 (13)
is the probability that Bob gets quadrature value x.
Since Eve does not know the sign of x, we can estimate
Eve’s information from the density operator conditioned
on the absolute value of x:
ρˆE(α||x|) ≡ P (α|x)ρˆE(α|x) + P (α| − x)ρˆE(α| − x),(14)
3where we define the probability that Alice’s choice is |α〉
when Bob gets x:
P (α|x) ≡ PB(x|α)
PB(x|α) + PB(x| − α) . (15)
Therefore, if Bob’s measurement result is ±x, Eve gets
either of the two mixed states ρˆE(±α||x|) corresponding to
Alice’s choice |±α〉, respectively. The next problem is how
Eve differentiates the given two signal ρˆE(±α||x|). In gen-
eral Eve may choose her measurement knowing the value
|x|. Here we restrict our analysis for the case that Eve
performs quadrature measurement and determines the bit
value according to the sign of her measurement result xE
as Bob does. In this case she does not use the information
of |x|.
For the PS protocol, Mutual information is written as
IAB(E) =
1
2
∑
|x|≥x0
PB(x)i(qB(E)(x)), (16)
where
PB(x) =
1
2
(PB(x|α) + PB(x| − α)) (17)
is the probability that Bob’s measurement result is x,
i(q) = 1 + q log2 q + (1− q) log2(1− q) (18)
is Mutual information of binary symmetric channel, and
qB(E)(x) is BER of Bob (Eve) conditioned on |x|. Since
i(q) is a decreasing function of q (0 ≤ q ≤ 12 ), qB(x) >
qE(x) for any x implying that any conditional use of mea-
surement result does not satisfy inequality (10).
Eve’s BER conditioned on |x| is the probability that the
signal is ρˆE(−α||x|) when the sign of Eve’s measurement
result xE is positive:
qE(x, η, δ) =
∫∞
0
〈xE |ρˆE(−α||x|)|xE〉dxE∫∞
0
(〈xE |ρˆE(−α||x|)|xE〉+ 〈xE |ρˆE(α||x|)|xE〉) dxE
(19)
=
1
2
P (α|x) erfc
(√
2λ(δx +
√
ηα)
)
+
1
2
P (−α|x) erfc
(√
2λ(δx−√ηα)
)
, (20)
where we use the definition of ρˆBE (8), Eqs. (12 - 14),
and quadrature distribution of coherent state |〈x|α〉|2 =√
2/pie−2(x−α)
2
, and we define erfc(x) = 2/
√
pi
∫∞
s
e−t
2
dt
and
λ ≡
√
(1 − η) + δ/2
(η + δ/2)(1 + δ)
. (21)
In what follows we set x > 0 for simplicity.
For sufficiently large x, qE is bounded above as
qE(x, η, δ) =
1
2
P (α|x) erfc
(√
2λ(δx+
√
ηα)
)
+
1
2
P (−α|x) erfc
(√
2λ(δx −√ηα)
)
≤ 1
2
{
erfc
(√
2λ(δx+
√
ηα)
)
+ erfc
(√
2λ(δx−√ηα)
)}
≤ erfc
(√
2λ(δx −√ηα)
)
≤ 1√
pi
e−2λ
2(δx−√ηα)2 =
1√
pi
e−2λ
2(δ2x2−2√ηαδx+ηα2)
<
e−2λ
2ηα2
√
pi
e−λ
2δ2x2 . (22)
The first inequality comes from the fact P (±α|x) ≤ 1.
The second inequality comes from the fact erfc(s) is a de-
creasing function of s with λ(δx −√ηα) ≤ λ(δx +√ηα).
Then, we use an inequality
√
pierfc(s)/2 =
∫∞
s
e−t
2
dt ≤∫∞
s
te−t
2
dt = e−s
2
/2 for s ≥ 1 assuming x is large enough
so that
√
2λ(δx − √ηα) > 1, which gives the third in-
equality. Further assuming x > 4
√
ηα/δ, we obtain the
final expression.
Bob’s BER conditioned on |x| is the conditional proba-
bility that the sent state is | − α〉 when his measurement
result x is positive:
qB(x, η, δ) ≡ P (−α|x)
=
1
1 + exp
[
8
√
ηαx
1+δ
] . (23)
Since qB ∼ exp
(
− 8
√
ηα
1+δ x
)
and qE < e
−λ2δ2x2 from ex-
pression (22), for any given δ > 0, there exist sufficiently
4large x where qE < qB holds. In such a condition, simple
PS setting higher threshold is no more advantageous. It
will be more efficient to discard higher quadrature value.
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FIG. 2: The security condition IAB ≥ IE cannot be sat-
isfied above the line for mean photon number n ≡ α2 =
0.001, 0.01, 0.1, 1, 10 by any postselection of quadrature mea-
surement. For continuous-gaussian-key-distribution protocol
the condition can be satisfied below the line ξ = 1. δ < 2η
is a necessary condition for any coherent-state-QKD protocol
given by an intercept-resend attack [12].
Figure 2 shows, the parameter region of η and δ which
satisfies qE ≤ qB for any choice of x for several mean pho-
ton number n ≡ α2. This means, above the line, any kind
of PS cannot achieve IAB ≥ IAE . We can see that larger
n seems to be more tolearant to noise. This is because, for
a given δ, if n is larger the effect of collective noise is rel-
atively smaller. It should be noted that choice of large n
results much smaller secure key gain for higher loss owing
to BSA [11]. The estimation of secure key gain with some
optimization of both Eve’s measurement and PS strategy
is left for full paper.
In this analysis we assume an ancillary system of am-
plifier is just traced out (See Fig. 1). It is likely that
the ancilla provides some useful information for Eve. In
this sense AMPBSA may be weak attack. The condi-
tion where Eve cannot access the ancilla can be realized if
Alice sends thermal coherent states ρˆ(α, 1, ηδ) instead of
coherent states and Eve performs just BSA. This case the
density operator of joint system is described by Eq. (8)
with the replacement ξ →
√
(1− η)/η.
In conclusion, we have investigated the security of CV
QKD using coherent states against amplification-beam-
splitting attack. This attack makes a link between “di-
rect” classical-teleportation attack and “indirect” beam-
splitting attack. It has been shown that the postselection
protocol setting higher threshold need not ensure the se-
curity in the presence of excess Gaussian noise.
We thank M. Koashi for helpful discussions.
[1] N. Gisin, G. Ribordy, W. Tittel, and H. Zbinden, Rev.
Mod. Phys. 74, 145 (2002).
[2] M. Hillery, Phys. Rev. A 61, 022309 (2000).
[3] T. C. Ralph, Phys. Rev. A 62, 062306 (2000).
[4] M. D. Reid, Phys. Rev. A 62, 062308 (2000).
[5] D. Gottesman and J. Preskill Phys. Rev. A 63, 022309
(2001).
[6] N. J. Cerf, M. Le´vy, and G. Van Assche, Phys. Rev. A 63,
052311 (2001).
[7] F. Grosshans and P. Grangier, Phys. Rev. Lett. 88, 057902
(2002).
[8] Ch. Silberhorn, T. C. Ralph, N. Lu¨tkenhaus, and G.
Leuchs, Phys. Rev. Lett. 89, 167901 (2002).
[9] F. Grosshans, G.V. Assche, J. Wenger, R. Brouri, N.J.
Cerf, and P. Grangier, Nature 421, 238 (2003).
[10] T. Hirano, H. Yamanaka, M. Ashikaga, T. Konishi, and
R. Namiki, Phys. Rev. A 68, 042331 (2003).
[11] R. Namiki and T. Hirano, Phys. Rev. A 67, 022308 (2003).
[12] R. Namiki and T. Hirano, Phys. Rev. Lett. 92, 117901
(2004)
[13] C. M. Caves, Phys. Rev. D 26, 1817 (1982).
[14] U. M. Maurer, IEEE Trans. Inf. Theory, 39, 733-742
(1993).
[15] C. H. Bennett, G. Brassard, C. Cre´peau, and U. M. Mau-
rer, IEEE Trans. Inf. Theory, 41, 1915 (1995).
